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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
One of the continuing research interests of the Policy Unit 
is the creation and operation of the common market at the level of 
commercial and industrial affairs. In this context, Dr. S. M. 
Senior Nello, of the University of Siena, has examined the role 
of EC Member States in trade between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Her conclusions, if acted upon, would lead to an increased role 
for the Community to replace bilateral trade relationships.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 























































































































































































This project was carried out for the European Policy Unit, 
and so is very much a policy study, geared to an assessment of EC 
policy towards East-West industrial cooperation agreements at 
both the governmental and firm levels. As such, the approach 
relies very heavily on the results of interviews with 
businessmen, academics and the officials of national and 
international organisations concerned with East-West affairs.(1)
In their dealings with East Europe, Western businessmen rely 
on support from their governments to a far greater extent than 
when they do business with any other group of countries. This is 
partly because the Eastern partners are hesitant about dealings 
with the West, and the support of Western governments for their 
businessmen helps to overcome this hesitancy by providing the 
official channels which Eastern partners are used to and 
understand. At the same time, in many Eastern countries Western 
businessmen maintain that they are at a disadvantage because they 
have to deal with foreign trade organisations which often occupy 
a monopoly position, and they feel that official Western backing 
may help to right the balance. In addition, Western firms find 
that their governments may play a useful role in overcoming the 
problems associated with East-West business by, for 
example, improving access to people and markets in East 
Europe, raising problems, such as those associated with 
countertrade, at government level, and so on. Given the hard 
currency shortages of East European countries, Western 
governments also play a crucial role in the granting of export 
credit subsidies.
At present most of these functions are carried out by the EC 
Member States, but there are many ways in which the Community 
could usefully extend its activity in this context. Indeed there 
are some ways in which the Community ought to extend its 
responsibility since the present failure to do so represents a 
contradiction of the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 113 of 
the Treaty of Rome.
One area where this is the case concerns the East-West 
cooperation agreements at the government level. These are 
currently mainly the responsibility of the Member States, but 
there has been considerable debate as to whether the common 
commmercial policy implies that they ought to be in Community 
hands. This issue is discussed in some detail in the first half 
of the article, and the conclusion is that the evidence points 
strongly in favour of Community responsibility. Though this 
would create certain difficulties in view of the failure of the 
EC and the CMEA to recognise each other, recent developments in 
the context of trade agreements between the EC and various East 
European countries suggest that these difficulties are not 
insuperable.
EC policy towards East-West cooperation agreements at the 
firm or enterprise level raises a number of issues, many of which 
are too complex to be treated adequately here. Still, perhaps 
the function of a policy study is as much to raise and draw 
attention to questions as to answer them. In addition, it was 




























































































interviews by experts on these topics. Mention has been made of 
the role of the Community with regards to the following:
a) ways of promoting East-West interfirm cooperation
b) improving the statistics available on East-West 
cooperation
c ) export credit subsidies
d) regulations against dumping and market disruption
e ) the import quotas of EC Member States
f) technology transfer
g) the role of tripartite (East-West-South) cooperation 
in the context of policies towards the less-developed 
countries
h) FRG-GDR interfirm industrial cooperation.
2. The Division of Competences between the EC and Member States 
with Regards to East-West Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Agreements
In order to understand the present dispute over the division 
of competences between the EC and Member States with regards to 
intergovernmental cooperation agreements, it is first 
necessary to describe these agreements and then to provide some 
historical background.
2/i Government-Level Cooperation Agreements
The government-level agreements which are relevant in this 
context are those involving "economic, scientific, industrial and 
technological cooperation".(2) As their name suggests,these 
agreements cover a wide range of topics. They are long 
term, generally lasting for 10 years, though some have no time 
limit. They represent official statements of intent concerning 
the development of cooperation and provide a framework in which 
economic activity can take place. Litvak and McMillan (1974) and 
Levcik and Stankovsky (1979) have carried out detailed analyses 
of these agreements, and say that they usually contain the 
following elements:
1. A declaration of mutual interest in cooperation and of 
the intention to promote cooperation between the 
enterprises and organisations of the two countries.
2. A specification of the economic sectors and areas of 
research where cooperation is to take place.
3. A definition of the forms of cooperation which are of 
particular interest to the two parties, for example 
co-production and specialisation, the establishment of 
joint ventures in third countries and so on.
4. Provisions for the establishment of Joint Commissions 
(discussed in more detail below) to implement the 
agreement. At times working parties for particular 





























































































2/ii The Historical Background to the Dispute.
According to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, after the 
end of the transitional period, only the Community could sign 
agreements with third countries on matters relating to the common 
commercial policy. The Commission was responsible for 
negotiating such agreements, though in consultation with the 
Council and "within the framework of such directives as the 
Council may issue to it".(3)
In the face of opposition from the Member States, the 
Commission postponed the deadline for all trade and cooperation 
agreements to come under Community control from 1970 until
1973. However, the debate continued, with the Member States 
invoking the Rome Treaty to argue that cooperation agreements 
should remain their sole competency. They maintained that 
Article 113 only stipulates Community responsibility:
"In regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the case of dumping or 
subsidies".
The fact that this quotation was proceeded by the word 
"particularly" and so reads "particularly in regard ..." was not 
interpreted by the Member States as implying that the Community 
could assume competences other than those listed, should such 
prove necessary to implement the common commercial policy.
The view that this list of competences is exhaustive was 
strongly challenged by the Commission. In particular, the 
Commission pointed to the decline of the tariff on industrial 
products and the emergence of new commercial instruments (4) as 
evidence that Community powers would need to be more extensive to 
be effective in implementing the common commercial policy.
The upshot of this debate was that while in 1975 the 
Community assumed responsibility for all trade agreements, 
government-level cooperation agreements with East European 
countries remain the responsibility of the Member States and the 
authority of the Community over these agreements is limited to 
where they affect trade. This division of competences has never 
been accepted by the Commission. At the time it put forward 
various proposals, such as the negotiation of framework 
agreements which would complement agreements already contracted 
by the Member countries, or coordination of the various bilateral 
government-level cooperation agreements by the Commission, but 
these did not meet the approval of the Member States. Instead 
what was agreed was the establishment of an information and 
consultation procedure for cooperation agreements between the 
Member States and East European countries. This procedure, which 
was set up in accordance with Council Directive 74/393 of July
1974, has the following aims:
1) to ensure that intergovernmental cooperation agreements 
conform to the common policies of the EC.
2) to encourage exchanges of information
3) to assess the value of measures which the Community might 




























































































In order to implement this procedure a special committee of 
high-ranking civil servants drawn from each of the member states 
and the Commission was established, and meets at regular 
intervals.
3. The Political Recognition Problems
The political recognition problem has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere, so will only be briefly mentioned here. (5)
In May 1974 the Council declared that the Community was 
prepared to negotiate on trade agreements with each of the East 
European countries after the transfer of authority for trade 
agreements from the Member States to the EC. In November of that 
year the Commission sent an outline trade agreement to the East 
European states. In 1976 the CMEA responded, proposing a 
framework agreement between the EC and its Member States and the 
CMEA and its Member States. Despite considerable subsequent 
negotiation, this framework agreement has been the basis of 
contention ever since, as both parties differ fundamentally as to 
its nature.
Though in 1979 the EC was prepared to concede that the CMEA 
Member States might also be parties to the framework agreement,it 
refuses to allow that EC Member States might also be so because 
this runs counter to Article 113.
The EC maintains that one of its major difficulties to such 
an agreement relates to the difference in nature between the CMEA 
and the EC. The EC stresses the intergovernmental rather than 
supra-national character of the CMEA, and the fact that its 
recommendations only acquire legal character if accepted by all 
CMEA Members. The EC objections are also voiced in the Irmer 
Report of the European Parliament which states:(6)
"The degree of integration and the powers of Comecon for 
instance cannot be compared with those of the Community; the EC 
has exclusive powers to pursue a common commercial policy whereas 
Comecon has no such powers. Admittedly, Comecon as an 
institution may conclude agreements but it has no legal powers 
whatsoever to impose the implementation of such an agreement on 
its members".
However, this EC objection must largely be regarded as a 
pretext. While the description of CMEA powers is formally 
correct, de facto the CMEA has stronger means of implementation 
and greater cohesion. Moreover, far from overcoming the EC 
difficulty, a reform of the legal structure of the CMEA, with the 
introduction of supra-national elements, is likely to render the 
EC even more diffident about bloc-to-bloc dealings.
These institutional questions are undoubtedly a cover for 
political difficulties in that the EC prefers direct contacts 
with the smaller East European countries and wants to avoid the 
Soviet involvement in these relations which bloc-to-bloc dealings 
between the EC and CMEA would imply.
As a result of these institutional and political differences 
the EC proposals for the framework agreement between the two 




























































































the EC, contacts between the two groups ought to relate mainly to 
the exchange of economic information and statistics, joint 
economic forecasts, standardization, more mutual efforts to 
control the environment and the harmonization of development 
plans. Given that the CMEA has not a legally binding common 
commercial policy, the EC agrees that the framework agreement 
could contain a general statement concerning the importance of 
mutual trade for the two partners and the desire to promote it, 
but maintains that this aim should be carried out by means of 
bilateral agreements between the EC and individual CMEA 
countries.
In contrast, the CMEA would like to see the framework 
agreement directly regulating trade relations between the two 
organisations, and including clauses relating to "most favoured 
nation" status, export credits and non-discrimination, even in 
the agricultural sector. The EC is opposed to the inclusion of 
these clauses in the framework agreement even though, for 
instance, it does not reject application of the MFN clause to 
East European countries.
Another stumbling block relates to the EC requirement that 
the agreement apply on all territory on which the Treaty of Rome 
applies and this would include West Berlin.
Given these fairly substantial differences at present the 
negotiations between the two groups are at a deadlock.
However, on 29 May 1985 in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev announced to 
Bettino Craxi, then President of the EC Council, that he was 
searching for a "common language" between the EC and Comecon and 
this may be taken as an indication of renewed attempts to find 
ways round this deadlock. Gorbachev said that he was ready to 
initiate relations with the European Community and recognised the 
latter as being a political and economic entity (7). The meeting 
during the Italian Presidency between Craxi and the head of the 
CMEA, Jaruzelski, in Poland also suggests a more promising 
outlook for EC-CMEA relations. It seems likely, though, that 
should a framework agreement finally prove acceptable to both 
parties, it will take the more limited form envisaged by the EC.
4 .The Implications of Political Recognition Problems for EC Trade 
Agreements with East European Countries
These political recognition problems are reflected in the 
fact that since 1975, when responsibility for trade agreements 
with third countries passed to the EC, of all the East European 
countries, only Romania has signed what amounts to a fully- 
fledged trade agreement. In contrast, the other East European 
countries rushed to replace their bilateral trade agreements with 
cooperation agreements.
There have, however, been various sectoral agreements 
between the Community and the smaller East European 
countries. From 1965 on, a number of agricultural 
arrangements, taking the form of exchanges of letters, were 
concluded between the EC and all the smaller East European 
countries except Albania and the GDR (for which such arrangements 
were unnecessary in view of the special German 
provisions,discussed below). In 1976 Romania signed a textile 




























































































agreements with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and 
China. There were also sectoral agreements for steel production 
with Czechoslovakia (in 1978), Hungary, Romania, Poland and 
Bulgaria.
Interpreting the acceptability of sectoral agreements 
widely, in addition to its steel and textile agreements, in 1980 
Romania signed a trade agreement with the EC covering other 
industrial sectors and one involving the establishment of a Joint 
Commission. The aim of introducing these agreements separately 
was to avoid the appearance of a traditional trade agreement and 
to conform, at least formally, to the official CMEA or Soviet 
view (described by Friesen(1976)) that sectoral, but not general, 
trade agreements were acceptable. Moreover, at a meeting with 
the European Parliament's delegation for relations with East 
Europe in April 1985, the Romanian Ambassador to the EC confirmed 
his Government's wish to adapt the legal framework of EC-Romanian 
relations by introducing a long-term cooperation agreement (8).
The 1980 Romanian initiative has been followed by one by 
Hungary, who wants incorporated into the agreement a statement to 
the effect that it now has a market economy run along the lines 
set out by GATT, and not a centrally-planned economy. The 
European Community maintained that this raised complex political 
questions, so at present negotiations have stalled.
Czechoslovakia is also interested in getting around the 
problem in the more orthodox Romanian way by having four or five 
trade agreements covering various sectors. Negotiations between 
the EC and Czechoslovakia to this end are still continuing.
Finally, as John Maslen (1984) points out (9), in addition to 
Romania,
"...several of the other CMEA countries have as active and 
frequent dealings with the Community institutions through their 
bilateral Embassies in Brussels as do many countries which have 
Missions accredited to the EEC."
5. Government-Level Long-Term Cooperation Agreements between
the EC Member States and Eastern Europe
The European Parliament lists 49 government-level 
cooperation agreements existing between the then 9 EC Members and 
East European countries in December 1979 (see Annex 1). With the 
exception of Ireland, which had agreements only with Poland and 
the Soviet Union, and the FRG, which clearly needed no 
additional agreement with the GDR, all the EC Member States had 
agreements with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. In addition Greece 
then had cooperation agreements with Bulgaria (11.25.72) Poland 
(11.4.75) and Romania (2.21.76) and trade agreements with other 
East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechosovakia, Poland, Romania 
and the Soviet Union) though the latter had to be replaced by 
cooperation agreements when Greece joined the EC.
The Irish case is an exception since there has never been 
much business between the Republic and East Europe. According to 




























































































only 41 million ECU or 1.3% of all Irish imports while exports 
amounted to 91 million ECU or 0.9% of Irish exports.
In most cases the EC Member States entered these cooperation 
agreements in response to pressure from East European countries, 
who understand and prefer official institutional channels, and 
this pressure was generally re-inforced by the demands of Western 
businessmen.
Virtually all these cooperation agreements were signed in 
the 1973-75 period, suggesting a common reaction to the EC 
decision to end bilateral trade agreements between its Member 
States and third countries, which eventually became effective 
from 1975. There seems to have been a type of band-waggon effect 
in an attempt to avoid being left out of the potential benefits 
that these cooperation agreements might offer. More 
importantly, it is sometimes argued that the EC Member States and 
East European countries shared an interest in using these 
cooperation agreements to substitute their earlier trade 
agreements in order to maintain their bilateral commercial links 
and bypass the transfer of authority to the Community level.
This is a serious claim, whose validity and implications will now 
be examined in more detail.
6. The Question whether the Government-level Cooperation 
Agreements of the EC Member States Conform to the Letter of 
Article 113
There have been several cases in which clauses in individual 
government-level cooperation agreements of the EC Member States 
have been challenged as running counter to Article 113 of the 
Treaty.
A European Parliament Document (the Schmidt Report, Document 
89/78 of 11 May 1978) cites a number of these. In particular 
various examples are given of individual Member States (Italy, 
the FRG and the Netherlands) including Most-Favoured-Nation 
clauses in bilateral agreements, and strictly, the granting of 
such concessions should fall within the competence of the'EC.
The Report also quotes instances of intergovernmental cooperation 
agreements containing provisions to grant import permits for 
products arising from cooperation projects (in the agreement 
between Italy and Romania of 1973 and that between the 
Netherlands and Poland of 1974). Finally, it mentions the 
Franco-Soviet Agreement of 1974 which contained a clause designed 
to encourage the sales of Soviet products in France.
A more recent example is provided by a number of government- 
level cooperation agreements signed between Greece and various 
East European countries, and these have also been the subject of 
questions in the European Parliament (10).
However, it is rare that the Member States challenge EC 
authority so flagrantly. As one national official stated, owing 
to the small number of people involved and the club-like nature 
of the information and consultation procedure, the 
representatives of each of the Member States know what will be 
acceptable at EC level, so can anticipate and ensure that 
cooperation agreements between their government and third 




























































































7. Whether the Government-level Cooperation Agreements of the
Member States Conform to the Spirit of Article 113
The real problem may therefore be another, namely: whether
the cooperation agreements of the Member States conform to the 
spirit and not just the letter of Article 113.(11) For example, 
as Connie M. Friesen (1976) says of the 1974 ten-year UK-Soviet 
Union agreement(12):
"It was an obvious attempt by both parties to circumvent the 
implications of the EC's common commercial policy. Even though 
the cooperation agreement takes advantage of the legal loopholes, 
it represents a violation of the spirit of EC policy".
A further example is provided by what is frequently referred 
to as the Franco-Soviet "Agreement" of 1982 (13).In fact there is 
no cooperation agreement as such (despite considerable Soviet 
pressure for one), and all that has taken place is an exchange of 
letters. The latter contains a clause allowing for the sale of 
agricultural produce and foodstuffs of French origin and has been 
the subject of a number of questions in the European 
Parliament.(14 ) In one of the debates which followed, speaking 
for the Commission, Mr. Haferkamp said:(15)
"The Commission considers that the agreement is in 
contravention of the provisions of Article 113 of the Treaty.
The Commission further insists that the exclusive competence of 
the Community in relation to the common commercial policy is to 
be respected and it is prepared to use the procedures provided by 
the Treaty to ensure that Member States do respect this 
competence".
The fact that the French refused to sign a cooperation 
agreement, but relied on an exchange of letters to achieve the 
same end, represents an attempt to get round the letter of 
Article 113, while at the same time violating its spirit.
The argument continues and the Commission has repeated its 
intention to take the case to the European Court of Justice, if 
necessary.
At times it may be difficult to establish whether an 
agreement runs counter to the spirit of Article 113. For 
example, if binding, a phrase like "the desire of both partners 
to encourage balanced trade" may imply a requirement to purchase 
a certain number of products, and this is clearly a commercial 
commitment. The problem here is deciding what exactly the terms 
of the agreement mean and how far they imply obligations.
However, there is one area in particular where cooperation 
agreements would seem to run counter to the spirit of Article 
113 and that is in the activities of the Joint Commissions, set 
up to monitor the implementation of the agreements. Levcik and 
Stankovsky (1979) describe the changing function of the Joint 
Commissions in the following words:(16)
..."a body whose functions had originally been limited 
primarily to handling grievances is being transformed into an 





























































































This changing role of the Joint Commissions means that de 
facto intergovernmental agreements are operating in very much the 
same way as the earlier trade agreements did. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see what functions a trade agreement could carry out 
which are not already being performed by the cooperation 
agreements. Moreover, during the Joint Commission meetings, the 
EC Member States are subject to constant pressure from 
businessmen, and from East European countries, to grant 
unilateral concessions which run counter to their EC and GATT 
obligations. Though at times the EC Member States may be only 
too glad to use the GATT or the EC as a scapegoat to avoid 
granting unwanted concessions (17), in many cases unilateral 
action might seem to offer the prospect of national advantage, so 
the danger of transgression is always present. To see how this 
is the case, a brief digression into the work of the Joint 
Commissions would therefore seem justified. First, however, it 
is useful to describe the interests of those affected by 
intergovernmental agreements, as this helps to explain why there 
should be conflict over the interpretation of Article 113.
8.The Interests of Various Parties Affected by Intergovernmental 
Cooperation Agreement.
Those affected by intergovernmental cooperation agreements are 
the businessmen and national officials of EC and East European 
countries who are concerned with EC-East European affairs, and 
the relevant Community officials.
The picture which emerged from interviews and from a 
questionnaire sent to firms (18) was that the main concern of 
many Western businessmen was "to be left to get on with the 
job" with a minimum of official interference. In this context 
the EC was often regarded as simply another source of regulations 
and protectionism. This viewpoint was very well expressed in a 
letter from a representative of the East European Trade Council 
in London who wrote:
"...ordinary businessmen who want to get on with the business of 
signing contracts tend to regard the EECs and ECEs of this world 
as a bit of an irrelevance."
Against this, various businessmen suggested areas in which 
they thought initiatives by the EC or national governments might 
be helpful to promote East-West cooperation at the firm level, 
and these proposals will be discussed in more detail below in the 
context of interfirm cooperation agreements.
The general view expressed by businessmen with regards to 
intergovernmental cooperation agreements was favourable, but 
there was some scepticism about the EC assuming responsibility 
for them. It was thought that EC-level agreements might be less 
effective than those of the individual Member States, and the 
problem of more conflicts of interest at the EC level was 
specifically mentioned in this context. However, in some cases 
the hesitancy about transferring responsibility to Brussels 
probably reflects self-interest in that businessmen probably 





























































































The interests of individual members of the national and 
Community administrations can, following W.J. Feld (1979), be 
described in terms of "power, prestige, income and security". 
They are concerned not only for the power, prestige and security 
of their own jobs,but also that of the institution in which they 
work.
In consequence, as Feld points out, national officials are 
extremely worried about transfers of authority to the EC level. 
This view is confirmed by Pinder (1979) who states that,unless 
obliged to by the Treaty, the Member States are very reluctant to 
create new Community instruments or align themselves to common 
policies. More specifically, on the question of EC-East European 
relations, Connie M. Friesen (1976) says:(19)
"The British Department of Trade and Industry, the Export 
Credit Guarantee Department and the East European Trade Council 
have played important roles in facilitating British Trade with
the East..... These agencies give no evidence of encouraging the
Commission in Brussels to play an active role in overseeing such 
major agreements as the British-Soviet (1974) trade agreement".
In particular, she says that the Member States are unwilling 
to renounce their authority over "import controls, credit terms, 
interest rates and barter and switch trading practices" .
Serving the general public is not always the best guarantee 
that the interests of national officials will be met, especially 
when lobbying and interest group activities come into play. In 
the context of East-West relations, businessmen and East European 
countries are likely to put pressure on national officials to act 
in their favour. In the absence of correspondingly effective 
countervailing power, for example on the part of foreign 
competitors, or Community or other international organisations, 
it may be that the interests of national officials are best met 
by giving in to the demands of businessmen, or East European 
countries. Moreover, it is clear that this type of 
discrimination is easiest if there are bilateral dealings with 
East European countries.
In contrast, the interests of EC Commission members in 
"power, prestige, and security" is best assured by giving as wide 
a possible interpretation to what lies within Community 
competence. Although even the Commission is not immune from 
national cleavages (20), generally speaking Commission Members 
tend to stress their role as "guardians of the Treaty of Rome" 
and demand the powers necessary to carry out that function. In 
its various reports (21) the European Parliament has also 
expressed a strong interest in an extension of Community powers 
in this context. The position of the Council is somewhat more 
ambivalent, since although it is a Community institution its 
Members are drawn from national administrations.
Turning to the interests of foreign trade officials in the 
smaller East European countries, there is an evident preference 
for bilateral dealings with the individual EC Member States as 
this would seem to offer more chance of obtaining special 
concessions for their country. The smaller East European 




























































































formal bloc-to-bloc EC-CMEA relations, because of the shift in 
power towards the Soviet Union that this would entail.
The Soviet position is rather more complex. While Soviet 
officials would like the increased sources of control that would 
result from formal EC-CMEA relations, like the smaller East 
European countries, they are aware of the advantages of pursuing 
their own bilateral arrangements with individual EC countries.
In summary then, there is a direct conflict of interests, 
with the EC Member States, businessmen and East European 
countries sharing a preference for direct bilateral links, while 
the Community wants to extend its range of influence.
9. Joint Commissions
In order to assess the role of the Joint Commissions, a case 
study was carried out for Britain which involved interviews with 
those participating in Joint Commission activities and an 
analysis of the reports of various meetings of the Commissions. 
The picture which emerges is that expressed in a publication of 
the East European Trade Council:(22)
"The annual Joint Commission meeting is regarded as one of 
the most important events in the official commercial calender and 
companies should be aware of its existence in order fal to feed 
into government any points they may wish the British team to bear 
in mind, (b) to study the reports which are published 
subsequently which act as signposts to current market priorities 
and (c) to participate as appropriate in any industrial Working 
Groups that may be formed under the auspices of the Joint 
Commissions".
The UK has Joint Commissions with all the East European 
countries except Albania. As the quotation indicates, there are 
annual meetings of these Commissions which take place alternately 
in London and the East European country. Responsibility for 
these bodies lies with the British Department of Trade and the 
respective East European Foreign Trade Ministries.
Though the exact arrangements vary according to the country 
involved, in meetings of the Joint Commissions, the British 
Department of Trade representatives are usually accompanied by a 
number of industrial observers (possibly 7-8) drawn from firms 
already operating in Eastern Europe or having a genuine interest 
in extending their activities to that area. In the case of 
Hungary, Britain has two Joint Commissions: one composed of
industrialists and the other, of government officials, and only 
after the businessmen have established contact do the civil 
servants meet. The arrangements are also different for the 
Soviet Union where there are a number of Anglo-Soviet Working 
Groups to monitor cooperation in individual economic sectors.
The companies chosen to participate in the activities of the 
Joint Commissions are changed from time to time in order to hear 
different viewpoints and ensure that the company does not obtain 
a monopoly of representation. The firms are first approached by 
the Department of Trade and Industry to see if they are 
interested in participating, and in general only reply positively 




























































































participation worthwhile. The companies which do participate are 
expected to reflect the general interests of their sector, as for 
instance the chemical industry for ICI, though some firms have a 
better record of doing so than others. While it is clear that no 
firm will promote its rival, in general they are only too willing 
to present the problems of their sector as a whole.
According to the reports of the Joint Commission meetings, 
the following represents a typical list of the topics discussed:
1) the state of the economy of the East European partner
2) trade issues
3) economic and industrial cooperation
4) problems experienced by firms engaged in East-West 
business
5) cooperation in science and technology.
The sections most relevant to the discussion here are 2), 3) 
and 4) above and these will now be considered in more detail.
9/i Trade Issues
Under the heading of trade issues, in addition to the 
invariable general discussion about how to increase the volume of 
trade between the two countries (export policy? Article 113), in 
most cases questions were also raised concerning the general 
system of preferences and import restrictions, especially for the 
textile and steel and iron sectors, as the following quotations 
show:
"The Polish delegation at the Joint Commission argued 
strenuously that a key element in their country's recovery would 
be their export performance. To assist this they hoped that 
there would be sympathetic consideration for an improved access 
to markets in certain products (e.g. textiles and steel), a 
preferential rate of tariffs and a temporary waiver of Poland's 
import obligations under the GATT. The UK delegation was unable 
to offer any commitments in those areas and pointed to the 
competent authorities in those matters, i.e. EC and GATT".
Summary Report of the Eleventh UK/Polish Joint Commission, 
Warsaw 22-24 October 1985.
"In order to increase the two way flow on a more diversified 
basis the Romanians requested that quotas falling within European 
Commission regulations be considered in a favourable manner and 
that the generalised System of Preference Scheme be expanded".
Summary Report of the UK/Romanian Joint Commission, Eleventh 
Session, held in Bucharist from 2-6 April 1984.
"They also asked for improvements in access for Bulgarian 
goods to the UK Market particularly textiles and ready-made 
clothing and iron and steel. They also expressed concern at the 
institution of anti-dumping action by the EC against certain 




























































































Summary Report of the Twelfth UK/Bulgarian Joint Commission, 
held in Sofia 12-16 March 1984.
"A frank exchange took place on import restrictions and 
quotas so that both sides understood each others' problems".
Summary report of the UK/GDR Joint Commission 10th Session, 
held in Berlin from 21-23 November 1983.
As the UK delegation itself argues, these matters lie beyond 
national competence so ought to be discussed at the EC or GATT 
level.
9.ii Industrial and economic cooperation
Under the industrial and economic cooperation heading, 
identification of specific industrial sectors for cooperation 
takes place, and the progress of cooperation in those sectors is 
discussed. The possibilities for cooperation in third markets are 
often also raised.
As mentioned above, government-level cooperation agreements 
usually single out specific areas for cooperation. The sectors 
most frequently mentioned in the agreements are: chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, heavy engineering, electronics, the power sector 
and agriculture. It is clear that these sectors cover a wide and 
important segment of the economy, and this is a deliberate choice 
since the aim is generally not to be too bureaucratic in drawing 
up the initial agreement, and to allow adequate scope for 
unforseen future developments. This leeway is particularly 
important as many East European officials tend to insist on close 
adherence to what was originally agreed.
However this should not be taken to imply complete rigidity 
as the lists are subject to annual review at the Joint Commission 
meetings. In general most areas for cooperation are carried 
forward from one year to the next though there may be changes in 
the slant or emphasis reflecting changing views about which 
sectors are most promising for cooperation.
Both businessmen and trade officials are involved in drawing 
up these lists, and at times UK firms can exert a certain 
influence on the choice of specific sectors for cooperation.
During the Joint Commission meetings specific projects are 
sometimes mentioned, as for example the Rombac Aircraft project 
in the UK/Romanian meeting of 2-6 April 1984.
9/iii The Problems Experienced by Firms Engaged in East-West
Business
If a number of firms experience a particular problem in 
their dealings with an East European country, the Western trade 
officials will raise it in the meetings of the Joint Commission, 
usually trying to avoid mentioning the names of specific 
companies. This official backing is considered particularly 
important by Western firms who often feel at a disadvantage in 
dealings with Eastern Europe as they have to negotiate with 
foreign trade organisations which are public bodies, usually 




























































































The problems most often raised in the Joint Commission 
meetings are those related to countertrade, and in particular the 
poor selection and quality of goods offered by the Eastern 
partner, and the possible difficulty of access to, and 
communication with, those responsible for foreign trade in the 
East European country.
10. The Practical Implications of Intergovernmental
Cooperation"Agreements for East-West Trade and Industrial 
Cooperation
The work of the Joint Commissions would seem to belie the 
notion that in signing cooperation agreements, Western 
governments simply create the framework for cooperation and then 
leave the firms to the practical business of carrying out East- 
West trade and industrial cooperation. Instead governments are 
involved in an ongoing process of export promotion for their 
firms, with one of the major aims of the Joint Commissions being 
to raise actual levels of East-west trade. Levcik and 
Stankovsky (1979) put this point very strongly:(23)
"...The textbook view which still enjoys credence in many 
countries, that economic matters are still exclusively the affair 
of autonomous economic units, and the state's role is only to 
create favourable general conditions for such activities is 
extended to economic relations with the countries with a state 
foreign trade monopoly. ...However cooperation agreements oblige 
Western governments to abandon the position of arbiter who only 
sees to it that the rules are observed and instead to perform 
positive acts to promote mutual economic relations".
The activities of the Joint Commissions, and ,in particular, 
the discussion of trade issues and problems, would seem strong 
evidence in favour of the view that the bilateral cooperation 
agreements between the EC Member States and East European 
countries are carrying out many of the same functions as the 
earlier trade agreements.
Moreover, the general feeling which emerged from the 
interviews was that government-level cooperation agreements, and 
especially the activities of the Joint Commissions, can have an 
impact on the level of East-West trade and industrial 
cooperation.
According to Western businessmen, the Joint Commission 
meetings increased their chances of signing contracts in a number 
of ways. At times East European organisations and enterprises 
may be diffident of Western contacts, but government backing for 
Western firms helps to overcome this diffidence and, for 
instance, UK firms found it useful to have their potential 
projects listed in official documents. Firms were also very much 
in favour of having Western governments raising their problems in 
Joint Commission meetings and also found discussions of their 
problems with other firms engaged in East-West business helpful. 
Finally, the Joint Commissions were thought to provide an 
important and continuing channel of communication, and Western 
firms find that, especially the meetings in the East European 
countries, serve as a valuable means of establishing contacts and 




























































































The verdict of trade officials working on the Joint 
Commissions was also that the Commissions could influence the 
level of East-West business, though the extent to which this 
occured depended on the East Europeans having a genuine interest 
in doing business and the overall political climate. For 
example, it was said that during the late 1970s, the economic 
recession, the worries about East European indebtedness and 
cooler East-West relations severely undermined the practical 
results achieved by the Joint Commissions. Recently, however, 
the changed economic and political climate has led to a renewed 
interest in East-West business and a greater emphasis on concrete 
proposals.
11. The Information and Consultation Procedure
Considerable problems arise in connection with the EC 
information and consultation procedure (described above) for the 
intergovernmental cooperation agreements of Member States. 
According to EC officials the procedure is not very efficient 
because of the reluctance (or failure) of the Member States to 
consult or provide information about their agreements in an 
effort to discriminate in favour of their own businessmen.
This opinion is confirmed in the European Parliament debate 
about the 1982 Franco-Soviet Agreement when, on behalf of the 
Commission, Mr. Haferkamp said:(24)
"Regarding the general problem of applying Council Decision 
74/393 EEC, it should be noted that the Commission, in its letter 
of 8 Feb. 1984 to the governments of the Member States, expressly 
reminded them of the procedural and material obligations arising 
from this decision. ...It drew the attention of all the Member 
States' governments to the importance of rigorously respecting 
Community jurisdiction and procedures".
12. A Possible Reform: Transfer of Responsibility for
Intergovernmental Cooperation Agreements to the EC 
Level
If cooperation agreements are de facto operating as 
trade agreements, and the activities of the Joint 
Commissions suggest that they are, leaving them in the hands of 
the Member States runs counter to the spirit of Article 113.
Given the decision to establish a common commercial policy, this 
policy must apply in dealings with all third countries, and the 
EC Member States should not be allowed to exploit legal loopholes 
in order to bypass the obligations of the Rome Treaty, and 
maintain bilateral commercial relations with an important group 
of countries.
As mentioned above, the national officials in the Member 
States are subject to considerable pressure from both their own 
businessmen and from East European countries to grant special 
concessions, and so are under frequent temptation to act 
unilaterally in contradiction with the common commercial 
policy. Moreover, there is a danger that if one Member State 
succumbs to this temptation the others may follow in a domino­
like effect. This potential danger would undoubtedly be reduced 
by EC responsibility for intergovernmental cooperation 




























































































bargaining position vis a vis the East European countries than 
would be possible for the individual Member States. In addition, 
the shortcomings of the information and consultation procedure 
would be overcome, so each Member State could benefit from more 
pooled information about individual experiences.
The experience of the EC Joint Commissions with Romania and 
China should help to overcome the hesitancy about the 
effectiveness of EC-level relations. In general there seems to 
be considerable satisfaction with the way in which the EC- 
Romanian Joint Commission operates, and such descriptions as 
exist (25) suggest that its activities are a close reflection of 
the British experience, with discussions about how to raise the 
level of mutual trade, the problems of compensation payment,the 
question of liberalising the EC quota system and so on.The 
difference consists in the common EC stand,and the reduced risk 
of unilateral action by the EC Member States.
13. The Legal Basis for EEC-East European Cooperation
Agreement s
There would seem to be a strong case for this extension of 
Community authority, as the East European countries are the 
exception rather than the rule, and the EC has signed cooperation 
agreements with 126 countries, most of which are in the less 
developed world.(26)
An example which deserves special mention is the EC-China 
economic and commercial cooperation agreement which was 
initialled in September 1984 and signed in May 1985. If the 
Community had attempted to base its authority to sign the 
agreement on Article 113 of the Treaty, there might have been 
lengthy wrangling with the Member States. To avoid this, the 
Community based its case on Article 235 of the Treaty according 
to which:
"If action by the Community should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one 
of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures".
Given that the Community has assumed responsibility for so 
many cooperation agreements, the question which then arises is 
why East European countries represent a special case, and the 
answer lies in the EC-CMEA political recognition problem.
These attempts by the smaller East European countries to get 
around the political recognition problem by using a series of 
sectoral trade agreements lend support to the views expressed by 
Mr. R. Bandilla of the EC Council (during an interview) and John 
Pinder (1975) who maintain that where the economic interests 
involved are strong enough, they win the day over political 
difficulties. The political recognition problems should not 
therefore pose a barrier to EC assumption of responsibility for 




























































































14.Industrial Cooperation Agreements at the Firm Level;The 
Definition Problem
An industrial cooperation agreement at the firm level is 
between Western enterprises, on one hand, and an East European 
Ministry, foreign trade organisation or enterprise on the other.
The first problem to arise in discussing these agreements is 
that of definition: there is no commonly agreed definition of
industrial cooperation agreements. Most of the early literature 
quotes the working definition of the 1973 ECE Analytical 
Report:(27)
"Industrial co-operation in an east-west context denotes the 
economic relationships and activities arising from
a) contracts extending over a number of years between 
partners belonging to different economic systems which go 
beyond the straightforward sale or purchase of goods and 
services to include a set of complementary or reciprocally 
matching operations (in production, in the development and 
transfer of technology, in marketing etc.); and from
b) contracts between such partners which have been 
identified as industrial cooperation contracts by 
governments in bilateral or multilateral agreements".
The definition then goes on to exclude specifically 
"arrangements under which repayment of equipment or technology 
transfer ... takes the form of deliveries of unrelated goods" as 
well as arrangements involving agricultural products.
However, this definition is plainly inadequate since its 
conditions are not even met by the later examples of the various 
types of industrial cooperation agreement described in the 
Analytic Report itself, many of which do not extend "over a 
number of years," while others involve agricultural products 
(p.94) or repayment in unrelated goods (p.97).
It is not surprising, then, that in later publications the 
ECE altered its definition. In 1976, as a result of a meeting of 
a group of experts under the auspices of the ECE, the following 
definition was put forward:(28)
"... a contractual economic relationship between two or more 
enterprises of different nationalities, extending over a 
longer period, whereby a community of interest is 
established for the purpose of complementary activities 
relating to the supply of licenses and equipment, 
development of new technologies, the exchange of information 
on, and the use of, those technologies, production and 
marketing with provision for the settlement in kind of whole 
or part of the obligations arising from cooperation 
activities."
This has certain advantages in that it is probably the only 
definition widely accepted in both East and West. Moreover, it 
forms the basis of many ECE studies which are probably the most 





























































































Nonetheless, considerable problems remain. In particular, 
it is difficult to know what precisely is meant by the phrase 
"community of interest" or even the word "cooperation" in this 
context. This point is made by Professor Carl McMillan, who 
argues that the term "cooperation" may even be misleading since 
it is not always appreciated that what is at issue is not a 
function or activity, but an institutional relationship.(29)
These difficulties are also reflected in the various ECE studies. 
The criteria of what constitutes an industrial cooperation 
agreement, and the breakdown of these agreements according to the 
different forms they may take, vary from one ECE publication to 
the next, making comparison over time very difficult. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to envisage how these problems could be 
avoided as the permutations taken by cooperation agreements are 
seemingly endless and moreover are evolving over time. The ECE 
definitions above probably represent the best attempt to meet 
these problems in that they do at least point to the main (or 
most typical) characteristics of cooperation 
agreements. However, given that exceptions remain, these 
characteristics should neither be regarded as necessary nor 
sufficient. They can be listed as follows:
(a) a transfer of technology from one partner to the 
other. Technology transfer is here taken to include 
the sale of licenses, equipment and components and the 
training of personnel;
(b) if trade is involved, there must be at least partial 
payment in kind.(30)
(c) that typically, though not invariably, the time period 
involved was greater than that of a simple one-off
sale.
Table 1, which is based on a questionnaire used by McMillan 
(1977b), presents a list of some of the forms interfirm 
cooperation may take. Again, while this list indicates something 
about the nature of interfirm cooperation, it is clearly not • 




























































































Table 1: A List of Some of the Forms Taken by Interfirm 
Industrial Cooperation
Provision of managerial services 
Sale of capital equipment 
Sale of complete plant 
Custom design of plant or equipment 
Training of Eastern personnel
Provision of technical assistance (know how)
A licensing arrangement
Supply of parts or components to the Eastern partner 
Provision by the Eastern partner of parts or components to 
be incorporated into the Western product
Provision by the Eastern partner of final products to the 
Western firm's specification to be marketed by the Western 
f irm
Agreement to specialize in the production of certain parts 
or components and then to exchange them so both partners 
produce the same product
Agreement to specialize in the production of certain final 
goods and then to exchange them so each partner has a full 
line
An agreement to market in specific geographic areas 
Exercise of quality control by the Western partner 
Cooperation in a joint project in a third country 
Coordination of research and development
Source: see text.
15. Statistics on Inter-Firm Cooperation Agreements
Partly as a result of these definitional problems, but also 
because of commercial confidentiality, precise statistics about 
interfirm cooperation agreements are not available. Estimates of 
the total quantity of such agreements usually take the form of 
counting the number of individual cases, and suffer from the 
obvious shortcoming that the value of the undertaking varies 
considerably from case to case.
On the basis of various Eastern and Western sources, Levcik 
and Stankovsky (1979) suggest that the number of all East-West 
cooperation agreements had reached about 600 at the end of 1973, 
and was over 1000 by 1975. This later figure was confirmed by an 
ECE report of 1976(31) and by a survey completed in the same year 
at Carleton University, Ottawa(32) which recorded the existence 
of 1,076 East-West interfirm agreements and 1,415 cooperation 
agreements though 'technical cooperation' agreements were 
included in this number. The various surveys also suggest that 
the number of industrial cooperation agreements has grown rapidly 
since the mid-1960's but remained relatively small compared to 
the total volume of East-West business transactions.
It is extremely difficult to find reliable estimates of the 
total financial value of these agreements. Though he probably 
includes Yugoslavia, Wilczynski (1976) puts the figure at $1 
billion, or roughly 2% of total East-West trade at that time. 




























































































'invested' by Western enterprises in East-West cooperation 
projects over the 1968-1978 period may have amounted to about 
$2.2 billion for manufacturing industry, and $16.7 billion for 
large-scale projects in the raw-materials and intermediate-goods 
industries.
As Table 3 shows, in the literature the estimates for the 
total share of East-West trade covered by interfirm cooperation 
agreements generally fall within the range of 2-5%. However, 
this percentage rises considerably for certain types of product 
and for certain countries. As Hill (1983)(33) reports, the 3-4% 
of all Hungarian exports to the West in 1975 which were covered 
by industrial cooperation agreements rose to 25% for machinery 
exports, while the Polish percentage of 1.5-2% rose to 10% for 
machine tool exports. Levcik and Stankovsky (1979)(34) quote a 
Polish source, according to which in 1970 14% of Polish capital 
goods exports (and 71% of those to the FRG) resulted from 
cooperation agreements. Various ECE reports(35) also put the 
overall share of trade arising from industrial cooperation^at 
4-5%, though on the basis of a Swedish study (Hogberg and Adahl 
(1979) p.43) they also maintain that:
"In certain countries - such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary - 
the share of trade under industrial co-operation is 
considered to be two to three times higher in the 
engineering industries than in total trade."
Nonetheless, as Hill points out, it is fairly safe to assume 
that the overall share of East-West trade covered by cooperation 




























































































Table 2 : The EC's Trade with Eastern Europe
value in million ECU
Imports Exports Trade Balanc
1958 1271 1113 - 158
1970 4452 4550 98
1973 6869 7557 688
1974 9312 11300 1988
1975 9791 13228 3437
1976 13036 14324 1288
1977 14141 15170 1029
1978 14908 15504 576
1979 18410 16826 - 1584
1980 22278 18870 - 3408
1981 24664 19539 - 5125
1982 24124 19984 - 9140
1983 31445 23436 - 8009
Source: SOEC monthly Bulletin on External Trade, Special
Issue 1958-1983, Statistical Office of the 
European Communities
Eurostat gives separate figures for EEC trade 
with Eastern Europe and FRG trade with the GDR 
and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, but here the 





























































































Table 3 : Share of Trade Arising from Industrial Cooperation
Agreements in Total East-West Trade
(percentages)
Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland







(1) 3-4% for Hungarian exports to the West
(2) 1.5 %-■2% of Polish exports to the West
Sources : Levcik and Stankovsky (1977 ) p . 177 for the 1973 and
1974 estimates, Hill (1983) p.37 for the 1975
estimates, and ECE (1981) p.17 for the 1975-79
estimates, all of whom base their percentages on
Eastern sources.
Table 4 : Major Western Participants in East-West Interfirm
Cooperation









Sources: ECE, Statistical Outline of Recent Trends
in Industrial Cooperation, 1976, 1977
However, estimates of this type are extremely tenuous, and 
not simply because of the problems of isolating that trade which 
results from industrial cooperation. As McMillan (1977) has 
pointed out, partners may, for example, cooperate in R and D but 
use their findings on the domestic market or in third countries 
so that the cooperation agreement has no impact on trade between 
the two partner countries. In addition as Hill (1983) says, it 
may be the case that trade through cooperation is not reported 
separately from a larger trade contract of which it forms part.
Bearing these shortcomings in mind, some indication of the 
patterns in East-West industrial cooperation may perhaps still be 
obtained by a combination of trade statistics and information 
from surveys on industrial cooperation. However, it is also 
necessary to remember that the surveys are not always strictly 
compatible, having different aims and being based on different 




























































































The surveys used for this purpose are those carried out by 
the ECE in 1973, 1976, 1977 and 1978 with sample sizes of 202, 
298, 658 and 314 firms respectively. In addition some of the 
results of the Carleton study, described by McMillan (1977b) are 
used. This was a survey covering 15 major Western countries 
(excluding the U.S.) which involved sending a questionnaire to 
642 firms believed to be active in East-West industrial 
cooperation. 46% of the firms replied. Other results presented 
here are taken from the Indiana Survey, carried out in 1976.
This was a mail survey which identified 320 US firms engaged in 
East-West Cooperation and was reported in Marer (1977) and Marer 
and Miller (1977). Finally,there is the Bradford survey, which 
was carried out in Britain and obtained replies from some 200 
firms. Its results are presented in Paliwoda (1981).
Table 5: Share of Each of the Present EC Member States in '
Trade between the Europe of Ten and East Europe
Imports Export s
1958 1970 1980 1983 1958 1970 1980 1983
FRG 25.0 28.2 30.7 30.5 30.0 33.4 40.7 42.5
France 16.3 11.6 18.9 14.5 15.8 16.7 20.0 18.5
Italy 9.7 21.3 19.3 20.9 9.7 18.2 11.9 15.1
NL 7.3 5.4 8.2 13.4 5.6 5.5 6.1 5.9
B/Lux 5.3 4.5 5.8 7.2 6.7 4.4 5.6 6.2
UK 26.3 21.8 10.8 8.4 23.2 16.0 11.2 7.9
Ireland . 6 .8 . 5 . 5 . 1 . 2 . 5 . 5
Denmark 5.3 3.8 3.7 2.7 4.7 2.9 1.7 1.4
Greece 3.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 4.1 2.8 2.4 1.8
Eur 10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Percentages on the basis of SOEC, Supplement to
the Monthly Bulletin on Trade, Special Issue 
1958-1983.
Table 6: Major East European Participants in Industrial
Cooperation
Carleton 1975 ECE 1976 ECE 1977 ECE 1978
Soviet Union 9.6% 13% 30% 41%
Hungary 34.4% 30% 25% 24%
Poland 23.4% 26% 19% 17%
Romania 9.6% 20% 15% 9%
Sources: ECE Statistical Outline of Recent Trends in Industrial





























































































Table 7 : Share of Each East European Country in Total EC-East
European Trade
Imports (to Eur 10) Exports (from Eur 10)
(1) (1) (1) (1)1975 1980 1982 1983 1975 1980 1982 1983
Soviet Union 45. 0 56.0 64.7 65.6 42.0 45.9 52.1 59.0
DDR 5. 5 4.4 4.9 5.0 3.9 5.0 4.1 3.9
Poland 18. 8 13.8 8.5 8.5 22.6 16.9 11.9 10.2
Czech. 9. 8 7.5 6.6 6.6 8.7 8.0 8.1 7.1
Hungary 8. 2 7.0 5.8 5.6 8.2 9.5 11.4 9.6
Romania 10. 2 8.8 6.7 6.4 8.8 10.0 6.2 4.3
Bulgaria 2. 5 2.1 2.3 1.8 5.8 4.4 5.9 5.4
Albania m3 .3 .4 .3 . 3 .2 .6 .4
(2)
% EC trade 6. 9 7.2 8.2 8.6 10.1 7.4 6.0 6.7
(1) EC 9
(2) EC-East European trade as a share of total extra-EC trade
Source : Elaborations on the basis of Eurostat data
Table 8: Major Industrial Sectors Engaged in Industrial
Coopérât ion
mechanical including transport chemicals electri- metall
engineer- machine equipment cal and urgy
ing tools electronics
ECE 1973 22% - 18% 18% -  -
Carleton
1975 36.42% 9-15% 9-15% 9-15%
ECE 1976 29. 2% (34.6%) 17.5% 14.4% 11% 7.4%
ECE 1977 22% 25.5% 12.6% 23.8% 13.8% 7.9%
ECE 1978 18. 2% (22.3%) 9.6% 26.1% 17.5% 8.3%
UK Bradford
1976 32. 4% 32.4% 3.8% 7.6% 5.4% 4.3%-
US Indiana
1976 18.7% 5.0% 20.5% 14.1% 4.5%
ECE Analytic Report (1973)
ECE Statistical Outline (1976) , (1977) and
(1978)
McMillan (1977a) p. 1188
Marer, Miller (1977) p. 19
Table 4 is based on the results of two of the ECE surveys
according to which the four largest EC countries accounted for 
55% of East-West industrial cooperation covered by the survey in 
1976 and 51% in 1977. The FRG is identified as the most 
important Western partner and this picture also emerges from 
Table 5 which shows how the German share in total trade of the 
present 10 EC Member States with East Europe rose considerably 





























































































Table 6 presents the results of four surveys which indicate 
that the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland were the most 
important participants in East-West cooperation. Allowing for 
problems of incompatibility of the survey results, the Soviet 
share seems to have risen over the period, while that of Poland 
fell.
A similar pattern is evident in Table 7, with the Soviet 
share in the imports from East Europe to the present 10 EC 
Members rising from 45% in 1975 to 65.6% in 1983, while the share 
of exports rose fom 42% to 59% over the same period. The 
equivalent statistics for Poland show a fall in the import share 
from 18.8% in 1975 to 8.5% in 1983 and of the export share from 
22.6% to 10.2%.
Table 8 shows the results of all seven surveys which suggest 
that most interfirm industrial cooperation during the mid 1970s 
occured in the mechanical engineering and chemical sectors, 
followed by the electrical and electronic and transport equipment 
sectors.
16. The Promotion of East -West Interfirm Cooperation
Turning to EC policy with regards to interfirm cooperation 
agreements, the questions raised are complex and far ranging. 
Rather than attempt a comprehensive treatment of these questions, 
the aim here is to identify particular areas where there seems 
scope for more EC action.
The role of the EC countries' embassies in Eastern Europe in 
promoting East-West trade and cooperation is widely recognised, 
and, for example, an East European Trade Council publication 
offering advice to British businessmen says:(36)
"The services which our Embassies have to offer are highly 
valued and are more badly needed in less familiar markets than in 
the better understood free economy markets where people can find 
their way round more easily. Businessmen are accordingly strongly 
recommended to take full advantage of them".
However the document goes on to warn:
"Whilst the Posts can and do offer appreciable help in terms 
of making market assessments, assisting in making appointments 
for visitors, trouble-shooting and advice, it is important to 
remember that their resources are limited".
Though there is already a certain exchange of information 
and pooling of resources among the embassies of the EC Member 
States, there would seem to be scope for further Community action 
here in encouraging and financing common efforts to provide 
market research, and in particular the identification of 
potential partners for inter-firm industrial cooperation, 
trouble-shooting, interpreting and translation services and 
information. This was probably the proposal for increased EC 
action which aroused most enthusiasm among the businessmen 
interviewed.
Another area for greater EC initiative would be in the 




























































































that a great deal of East-West business is concluded at such 
events but the organisational costs are considerable.(37) An EC 
contribution to these costs would seem an effective way of 
promoting exports. The EC has also organised business-weeks with 
Yugoslavia and China, and though the latter was the occasion of 
the largest and highest-level Chinese delegation ever sent to the 
West, the political recognition problem might pose problems for 
direct EC sponsorship of trade fairs with other CMEA Members.
17. Providing More Information and Statistics about Industrial
Cooperation Agreements
As mentioned above, the lack of statistics, and information 
generally about interfirm cooperation agreements is staggering. 
For example, as Mr. Jahn pointed out in a European Parliament 
debate (12/5/76),the Federal Government in Bonn estimated that 
the number of contracts between West German firms was probably in 
the region of 350, but admitted that it might be as much as 600.
The reaction of the EC Council and Commission to this 
comment was that individual interfirm cooperation contracts were 
the concern of private enterprise, and while the latter was 
subject to national and EC regulations it should be left "the 
greatest possible freedom to get on with the job".(38)
This reply should carry no weight against the argument for 
improved information and statistics. There is no reason why 
simply having a clearer idea of the share of interfirm 
cooperation agreements in total East-West business should 
necessarily curtail the freedom of action of firms. Moreover, a 
great deal could be achieved just by collating the information 
already possessed by the various official and semi-official 
bodies in the individual Member States. In addition to the 
foreign trade ministries and Chambers of Commerce in each 
country, there are organisations such as the ACECO in France and 
the East European Trade Council in Britain whose aim is to 
encourage and advise firms with an interest in East-West trade.
On the basis of contacts with these organisations, Eurostat 
could begin to provide statistics about EC firms involved in 
East-West cooperation. The Community could perhaps also 
encourage greater exchanges of information about interfirm 
cooperation, and the problems involved, among the national 
organisations.
18. EC Policy towards Export Credit Subsidies
The lack of a coordinated EC export credit policy is 
undoubtedly one of the major causes of difficulty in East-West 
interfirm cooperation and trade(39), and this is an area in which 
businessmen would like to see greater harmonization of the 
policies of EC Member States. In some cases they also said that 
they were in favour of the Community'carrying out a more active 
role in providing export credits and, especially, reinsurance, 
though opinion on this point was divided, with some firms arguing 
that existing national measures were sufficient.
With
regards to the need for coordination and harmonization of the 
export credit systems of the Member States, there is a risk that, 




























































































credit subsidies to favour their own businessmen. This has the 
effect of distorting competition and may even lead to an export 
credit war. This risk is thought to be particularly grave in the 
case of business with East European countries, given their 
foreign currency shortages and high levels of indebtedness. On 
this point most of the British firms interviewed maintained that 
they were at a competitive disadvantage because of the more 
favourable export credit terms available in other EC countries. 
However the other EC countries mentioned varied from case to 
case, with Italy, France and the FRG occuring most often. No 
doubt had businessmen from other countries been interviewed, the 
list of offending countries would have been different, and the UK 
might have appeared among them.
Turning to the development of EC export credit 
measures, there have been proposals for a Community export 
reinsurance policy and for the establishment of a European Export 
Bank. As Pinder (1975) describes, it was envisaged that this 
European Export Bank could provide finance for industrial 
cooperation projects which were too big for the Member States to 
handle on their own, or for projects involving more than one EC 
Member State where it was difficult to assemble a package of 
finance from those countries.
That the Community could implement such policies was 
confirmed by a 1975 Court of Justice decision (40) which 
maintained that export credit subsidies were an instrument of 
commercial policy and so fell within the Community competences 
listed in Article 113. However, harmonization is now a dead 
letter, and the proposals for a Community role in granting export 
credit subsidies have come to nothing. It is interesting to 
consider why this has been the case, what Community achievements 
there have been, and where there is room for further EC action.
Though harmonization has not been a success, a certain 
amount of coordination of national policies has been achieved 
both at the EC and OECD levels. The main forum for the 
international discussions on export credit matters is the OECD, 
and this has the obvious advantage over the EC of including the 
U.S., Japan and other major industrialized countries.
Apart from in discussions on technical questions, the 
Community represents the Member States in the OECD forum and the 
individual EC countries have only observer status there. The 
arrangements agreed on in the OECD forum are incorporated into 
Community law and are therefore binding on the EC Member States.
The first of these OECD arrangements was agreed in 1976 and 
entailed an international consensus or "gentleman's agreement" on 
interest rates, maturities and other loan conditions. In 1978, 
detailed guidelines to implement this consensus were drawn up and 
in 1983 a tightening of the consensus was agreed on which reduced 
minimum interest rates, introduced a new automatic adjustment 
mechanism for minimum interest rates, and established a new 
system for countries with interest rates lower than the specified 
minimum. There have also been attempts to include sectors such 
as nuclear power equipment (now covered),agriculture and 




























































































The overall tendancy has therefore been for the consensus to 
move in favour of tighter controls of export credit subsidies, 
and the general opinion seems that the OECD arrangements have 
been successful in confining some of the worst excesses.
However certain problems remain, as a European Parliament 
document explains :(41)
"Rapidly rising, but also diverging interest rates have 
meant widening and varying gaps between market rates and 
"consensus" interest rates and hence a great increase in interest 
rate subsidies by certain countries in particular. The 
continuing practice of providing mixed credits ... has not been 
properly covered by the agreement".
Further difficulties arise because of different opinions as 
to what the consensus should entail and where it should be 
leading, with the Japanese pushing for lower consensus interest 
rates and the US for higher ones. The EC position, which opposes 
any major adjustment to the consensus, also masks a wide range of 
opinions. On the one hand, the British maintain that the 
consensus should ultimately aim at eliminating all export 
subsidies, while on the other, the French want to restrict the 
consensus to its present limited role of avoiding the worst 
excesses .
In addition to realizing at least some degree of 
coordination at the OECD level, Community representation of the 
Member States in OECD discussions has meant that a common EC 
position has to be worked out. This takes place in the EC 
"Nationgroup" or Policy Coordination Group for Credit Insurance, 
Credit Guarantees and Financial Credits.(4 2 ) This body is 
responsible for carrying out the EC information and consultation 
procedure in matters of export credit subsidies (4 3 ) and all new 
credits of over 5 years duration have to be submitted to this 
procedure.
According to those involved (i.e. Commission and national 
officials and the representatives of some banks), the 
consultation procedure works fairly efficiently and has led to a 
certain convergence of opinion among Member States. This group 
meets every three weeks and at each meeting two countries are 
considered,and contentious cases are raised. Though at times the 
Commission has difficulty in obtaining information from the 
Member States, it was thought that ultimately it usually 
succeeds. The main topic discussed is the OECD consensus,while 
since 1978 the question of harmonization of the different export 
credit systems of the Member States has not even been raised.
Harmonization is now considered too difficult in view of the 
divergent monetary conditions of the EC Member States and the 
differences in their financial institutions.
It was partly because of this lack of harmonization that the 
proposal to establish the European export bank was shelved. 
However, the proposals also ran into difficulties because of 
fears that it would compete with national institutions. In 
addition there is the tricky question of how the bank should be 
funded and by whom, with for instance the Germans arguing that 




























































































counter to their law (though of course in another context, that 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, de facto German funds are used 
for this purpose). The problems are considerable and the 
political will necessary to overcome them is simply not there.
Nonetheless, there are certain initiatives which the EC 
could take with regards to export credit subsidies. As Ferdinand 
Glibert (1983) argues, there is a very strong case for the 
establishment of an EC body responsible for the reinsurance of 
national credit insurers. Glibert, who was consulted by the 
Commission about the proposal to set up the European export bank, 
maintains that the failure of this initiative was inevitable as 
the project was too ambitious. To avoid this problem he 
suggested that the proposed EC institution should confine itself 
to three activities: mandatory reinsurance (of 5-10% for special
business i.e. that involving credits of 5 years or more); 
voluntary reinsurance (to help national insurers to rebalance 
their portfolios) and direct insurance, where this was acceptable 
to national insurers. In addition, as Glibert argues:(44)
"Whereas at present the services of the Commission only have 
abstract knowledge of the business and are ill advised of the 
problems, especially technical, a European entity could determine 
the divergencies between national systems, policies followed and 
their justifications or lack of justifications. Moreover, to 
make reinsurance decisions and manage its portfolio, it would 
have to establish a third country policy (amount of risk and 
length of credit). It would be on the Coordination Group and be 
able to make more enlightened common policy recommendations.
It could also encourage national insurers to follow its 
policies by determining differences, recommending more uniform 
texts and even granting preferential rates for national insurers 
which follow its suggestions".
19. EC Market Disruption and Anti-Dumping Regulations
Another issue usually raised in connection with East-West 
trade and interfirm cooperation concerns the pricing of East 
European products on Western markets. Although the usual 
phrase, "anti-dumping" measures is used here, it is important to 
remember that, applied in this context, the term "dumping" is not 
strictly accurate since what is at issue is the East European 
countries being made to respect EC price levels rather than some 
question of below-cost pricing. Though a detailed analysis of 
this question is not possible here, it would seem interesting to 
present the views on this topic expressed by EC and OECD 
officials .
While the pricing of East European products was recognized 
to be a problem, it was thought that, at least from the EC point 
of view, this problem had not reached the dimensions feared in 
the early 1970s, partly because the then expected rapid expansion 
in East-West business has not been realized.
The general opinion was also that the EC anti-dumping 
machinery was efficient, and if anything, too efficient, despite 
the Community being relatively understaffed in this area, having 
only about 20 personnel, compared to the equivalent staff of 150 




























































































the statistics, with, of a total of 315 cases of EC anti-dumping 
actions over the 1970-82 period, 122 involving East European 
countries (45). This is a high percentage, especially in view of 
the relatively low share of extra-EC trade accounted for by these 
countries (see Table 7 above). In addition, as John Maslen 
(1984) points out, the number of anti-dumping cases rose 
considerably over the 1981-2 period, with 106 of the total 315 
cases occuring in those two years (and 59 of all the cases 
concerning Eastern Europe). The sectors most affected were 
chemicals and engineering, while the GDR and Czechoslovakia were 
the East European countries most frequently involved.
In general, these anti-dumping cases have led to the smaller 
East European countries raising their prices, though the Soviet 
Union has often preferred to accept the Community anti-dumping 
duties on its products rather than participate in the 
investigation. However, a major reservation expressed about the 
anti-dumping measures is that their severity varies considerably 
according to the industrial sector.
In contrast, the safeguards procedure used by the EC to 
prevent market disruption has rarely been used as it is 
considered a double-edged weapon, running the risk of 
retaliation. Nonetheless, should the procedure be applied and 
imports of certain products to the EC be suspended, EC firms 
which have concluded cooperation agreements with compensation 
payments in those products could find themselves in difficulty. 
The advice of the EC Commission is therefore that all firms 
accepting compensation payment should include an escape clause in 
their contract to cover such an eventuality(46).
20. Quantitative Restrictions on EC-CMEA Trade
The EC Member States have maintained more quantitative 
restrictions in their commerce with state trading countries than 
with any other group of countries. It is not surprising, then, 
that, as mentioned above, one of the main topics raised by the 
East European countries in the Joint Commission meetings (as well 
as in other fora) is the liberalisation of the import quotas of 
individual EC countries. This request is echoed by various 
European Parliament documents (47), though these place the main 
emphasis on harmonization of the import quota lists. The various 
quotas also apply on trade arising from interfirm cooperation 
agreements, and no special concessions are made for the latter.
The arrangements for China and Romania are slightly 
different since the Joint Commissions enable the lists of quotas 
to be negotiated directly each year between the Community and 
those countries (48).
For the other East European countries, in accordance with 
the common commercial policy, the Community is responsible for 
the lists of national restrictions of each of the Member States 
and for the liberalisation lists. When the last national 
restriction against a particular product is dropped, the 
Commission adds that product to the liberalisation list, and it 
becomes subject to the surveillance and safeguards procedures for 
products coming from GATT member countries. Both the lists of 
liberalisation and of national restrictions are reviewed 




























































































percent either way, so most quotas can be amended by the Member 
States in cases of emergency.
The most recent updating took place on 30 June 1984 and 
entailed that a total of some 7600 Nimexe headings of the 
Community's Common Customs Tariff (CCT) about 1420 are partially 
or totally under quantitative restrictions in at least one Member 
State.(49) As Table 9 shows, Italy is the main culprit with 
nearly 930 restrictions, and there are considerable variations in 
the number of quotas applied by each of the Member States.
Table 9: The Number of Quantitative Retrictions Maintained on




BNL DK D F IRL IT GB Gr
314 233 163 334 179 929 335 274
Source: Updating of Annex to Council Regulation 
No. 3420/83 of 14 November 1983, OJ C 181 Vol.
27 of 9 July 1984.
According to the EC Commission, these restrictions affect 
some 3-6% of actual EC-East European trade, the exact percentage 
varying according to the countries in question,but the impact on 
potential trade, in the sense of trade which would take place in 
the absence of such restrictions, is clearly much greater. Many 
of these restrictions are on textiles (reflecting the operation 
of the Multifibre Agreement), footwear and the metallurgy 
sector, so, at least in some cases, are of considerable 
importance to the East European country concerned. While during 
interviews EC officials described these quotas as "relics of the 
past" maintained in response to local pressures to preserve 
employment, and did not consider them to be very important, it 
was fully admitted that they run counter to the principles of a 
common market laid out in Article 113 of the Treaty. That some 
progress towards liberalisation is being achieved is evident if 
the present figure of 1420 is compared with the 1570 restrictions 
reported by K.Taylor (1977) for 1975. John Maslen (1984) reports 
that the annual decision usually enlarges the quotas by about 
1.5 - 3.5 percent (50). However, as the European Parliament 
Reports argue, continued efforts towards the harmonization of 
these quotas are necessary.
21. Technology Transfer
Both government-level, and, by definition, interfirm 
cooperation agreements involve technology transfer, but clearly 
the question of EC policy must be considered in relation to 
technology transfer in general, and not just that arising from 
industrial cooperation.
The international forum in the West for discussions of 
technology transfer is CoCom, or the Nato coordinating committee, 
which is composed of Japan and all NATO Members except Iceland 
and Spain. The main functions of CoCom are to maintain lists of 
strategic items subject to embargo and monitoring and to try and 
secure agreement on enforcement, so as to minimize exports of 




























































































In recent years Cocom been under considerable strain 
especially because of diverging views between the U.S. and 
Western Europe with regards to trade sanctions and embargos (51). 
These differences were reflected for example in the sharp 
exchanges over the gas pipeline (in particular during the Ottawa 
Summit of 1978) and the fact that the U.S. sanctions against the 
Soviet Union following events in Afghanistan and Poland were only 
matched by an EC commitment not to undermine those sanctions.(52) 
There have also been complaints that the U.S. has been using its 
dominant position to further its own political and commercial 
interests, with, for example, these grounds being used by the 
French in their criticism of the American move to exempt China 
from the Cocom lists.
In part, these differences may be said to reflect the 
respective levels of dependence on trade with the CMEA countries. 
In 1983 the EC 10 accounted for 63% of all imports from the 
CMEA countries and about 51% of all exports, while the U.S. share 
amounted to only 5% of imports and 12% of exports. Moreover, the 
composition of trade was very different, with grain being 
especially important for the U.S., while Europe is more concerned 
with industrial plant and equipment. Indeed, the Soviet Union is 
the largest single importer of EC machine tools and the prospect 
it offers as a huge unexploited market is considered with special 
interest by the EC electronics industry.
The obvious implication for the EC would be to adopt a more 
united stand with regards to technology policy. However, that 
the Member States are still a long way from this is evident, for 
example, from the debate over economic sanctions following events 
in Poland, when Greece was totally opposed to any Community 
action and Denmark later wanted to pull out (53). Even with 
regards to application of the Cocom lists there are variations 
among the Member States, with possibly the UK adhering closest to 
the U.S. line and France, the least. Of those interviewed, the 
European Parliament staff, who are currently working on a new 
report on EC policy with regards to trade embargos and sanctions, 
came out strongest in favour of increased efforts to develop a 
common EC position towards technology transfer. It was argued 
that this would not only help to encourage a more moderate 
approach within the Cocom framework, but would also favour the 
development of the EC electronics and other high technology 
industries and would serve as a check on U.S. export control 
regulations, which, at present, apply extra-territorially and 
retro-actively to the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, 
to exports of products based on US-origin technologies and to re­
exports to third countries of U.S. products (54).
However, many felt that the development of a fully-fledged 
EC technology policy was premature, and, moreover, was not among 
the Community competences listed in the Treaty of Rome. Indeed, 
insofar as technology has direct or indirect military 
applications it is specifically excluded from Community powers by 
Article 223 of the Treaty. An interesting opinion to emerge from 
the interviews was that what was needed was more analysis of the 
actual impact of technology transfer on the East European 
economies, of the type currently being carried out by the 
OECD.(55) This might make it easier to draw the military/non- 
military borderline and depoliticize the issues for certain types 




























































































universal support for the view that the EC Member States would 
all stand to gain from increased efforts to work out common 
positions.
22. Tripartite Cooperation Agreements
There may also be scope for a more active Community role in 
relation to tripartite industrial cooperation and industrial 
cooperation in third countries, which are defined by the Unctad 
as : (56)
"the way in which enterprises from both socialist countries 
and developed market-economy countries are jointly carrying out 
industrial projects or other forms of joint operation in a 
developing country in cooperation to a greater or lesser extent 
with local companies and/or authorities .... In tripartite 
cooperation partners from all three groups of countries are 
responsible signatories and actively participate in the co­
operation. In the cooperation in third countries the client is 
the passive recipient of the undertaking who takes over the 
project when it is finalized. In practice, however, this 
distinction is rather difficult to make...."
A further distinction which is necessary is that between 
protocol or framework agreements, and legal business contracts 
among the partners. The former announce the intention of the 
partners (usually a Western company and Eastern foreign trade 
organisation) to cooperate in a particular field in third 
countries but there is seldom any statement about how and where 
this cooperation will take place. The latter are contracts 
signed by the partners to carry out a certain project or 
undertaking, or to establish a more continuous form of 
cooperation, such as the building and operation of factories, 
hospitals hotels and so on.
There is considerable debate about how widespread tripartite 
cooperation is. As M . Gomez (1984) (57) points out, some 
economists (such as those at the Organisation for International 
Economic Relations) argue that this form of cooperation is a 
passing phenomenon of marginal importance, given far more 
attention in the literature than the reality deserves.
This is not the view of P. Gutman (1981) or the Unctad. 
Though Gutman has been accused of some double-counting, he 
estimated that by the end of 1979 some 230 business contracts and 
119 protocol agreements had either been completed or were in 
progress. As Table 10 shows, Gutman found the EC countries and 
the FRG in particular, to be the most important Western partners. 
Gutman's results are largely in line with those of the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, according to which there were over 300 business 
contracts completed or in progress by the end of 1982, and a 
further 30 protocol agreements over the 1980-82 period. M. Gomez 
(1984) maintained that tripartite cooperation agreements 
accounted for 4-10% of all East West interfirm cooperation 
contracts in 1980, or less than 1% of all world trade.
Despite the relatively small scale of tripartite 
cooperation, both Gutman and the Unctad attach great importance 
to this form of cooperation as, inter alia, a means of 




























































































industrialization and development of the Southern partners, 
instance, the Unctad (1984) argues:(58)
-34-
For
"A developing country is enabled to receive the highest 
possible technology at the lowest cost when building up its 
infrastructure or production capacity. The development process 
and industrial process and industrial infrastructure is 
strengthened, not only through the direct transfer of the 
technology included in the new production plant, but also through 
the transfer of know-how gained during the active participation 
in the project execution.
The know-how adopted by managers and workers in the developing 
country is enriched by often diversified expertise and working 
methods implemented by the project participants from different 
groups of countries" .
Table 10: Participation by EC Countries in Tripartite Industrial
Cooperation Percentages
Business Contracts Protocol Agreements
1965-75 1976-79 1965-75 1976-79
(138 cases) (88 cases) (37 cases) (82 cases
Belgium 5.2 3 2.7 8.5
Denmark 0.6 - - 1.2
France 26.7 15.2 24.3 11
FRG 20.9 24.2 29.7 25.6
Ireland .6 - - -
Italy 12.8 8.1 5.4 2.4
Netherlands .6 2 5.4 11
UK 5.8 10.1 2.7 3.7
EC total 73.3 62.6 70.3 63.4
Total West 100 100 100 100
Source: P. Gutma n(1981 )
However, various authors , including Gomez, put something *
a damper on these rather idealistic expectations of tripartite
cooperation. For instance it has been argued that the correct
term is tripartite cooperation in developing countries rather 
than with them, as these countries rarely participate in the 
management of such projects and often do little more than provide 
local labour, raw materials or a market.
But even this more limited role may be of benefit to the 
developing countries. As the EC Member States are the most 
frequent partners in tripartite cooperation agreements, the 
Community should perhaps take more consideration of the potential 
offered by this type of cooperation in connection with its policy 
towards less developed countries.
The Community could perhaps encourage the exchange of 
information and experiences among existing and potential partners 
to try and ensure that projects are sound and feasible as only 




























































































this could be achieved by the EC organising or subsidizing 
conferences at regular intervals among businessmen and trade 
officials from the countries involved.
The difficulties of tripartite cooperation are notorious: 
complicated and lengthy negotiations; the need to adjust to 
differences in legislation, business practices, technology and 
technical standards and working mentality and methods; the 
difficult geographical and environmental conditions and so on. 
These conferences and exchanges of information would provide 
opportunities to discuss such problems and find ways round them 
and, as the case of the Joint Commissions shows, businessmen 
often find this type of discussion useful.
The quality of the contract agreed among the partners is 
also very important, and there are a number of model contracts 
prepared by the ECE, ICC, FIDIC, Unctad and so on. Discussion of 
these contracts at the conferences might lead to greater 
awareness by the developing countries, so placing these in a 
stronger position in terms of bargaining powers and skills vis a 
vis their northern partners.
Finally, applied in the context of tripartite cooperation, 
an EC role in the reinsurance of exporters (see above) would also 
imply benefits for the partners from less-developed 
countries. This could perhaps be carried out in connection with 
the initiatives already taken by the European Investment Bank,and 
the European Development Fund with regards to these countries.
23. Interfirm Industrial Cooperation between the FRG and GDR
It is sometimes argued that the special EC provisions for 
German internal trade put West German firms engaging in 
industrial cooperation with the GDR at an advantage compared to 
their competitors in other EC countries.
These provisions, set out in the Treaty of Rome (59), entail 
that trade between the FRG and GDR should not be subject to the 
Community customs regulations applicable to goods from third 
countries. In this way the West German principle that although 
there are two German states, there is only one German nation,is 
respected.
In practical terms, the EC provisions mean that imports from 
the GDR are not subject to the Community customs tariff or quota 
system or to the levies on agricultural products coming from 
third countries. However, they are subject to controls, 
licensing procedures and quotas imposed independently by the FRG, 
and these covered an estimated 35% of industrial goods and 86% of 
agricultural goods in 1981. In order to encourage German 
internal trade, the Federal Republic also gives the GDR a special 
interest-free swing credit which amounted to 770 million DM in 
1983 .
A study carried out by the German DIW (Deutsches Institut 
fur Wirtschaftsforschung) (60) concluded that these provisions 
involve a transfer from the West German government to the GDR and 
also to the private sector of the FRG economy, but said that 
quantification of that transfer was extremely difficult. For 





























































































firm may be able to benefit from the lower cost conditions in the 
GDR, and, insofar as payment is in kind, it will be exempt from 
the Community quota and tariff conditions. At the same time the 
use of compensation payment (and possibly also of the West German 
government's swing credit) will ease the constraint imposed by 
the shortage of foreign currency on the Eastern partner, so may 
even enable a greater volume of business to take place.
The other EC Member States have therefore repeatedly 
expressed fears that these special German provisions may lead to 
competitive distortions, market disruption or potential abuses. 
However, as an European Parliament Document explains, the worst 
abuses seem to have been eliminated.(61) Moreover, the 
competitive distortions arising from the special German 
provisions would also seem to be relatively small-scale.
In 1983 the East German share in all FRG imports was only 
1.8%, while the export share was 1.6%. (62) In addition the East 
German share in FRG trade fell steadily from 2.2% in 1960 to 
1.5% in 1981. The FRG share in East German trade also declined 
steadily over the same period from 10.3% in 1960 to 8.3% in 
1981.(63) Although inter-German trade rose rapidly over the 
1980-1983 period, John Garland (1985, p.8) attributes this to the 
GDR's hard-currency crisis at that time and to the fact that 
supplier credits were more readily available in the FRG than in 
other Western countries. He therefore explains the 1984 fall in 
real terms of inter-German trade as the GDR "returning to a more 
natural diversification of its suppliers".
Tirapolski and Globokar (1984) have carried out a study of 
FRG-GDR interfirm industrial cooperation and provide some 
indication of its scale. They maintain that cooperation dates 
from the early 1970s with the first really large contract being 
signed in 1976 for a value 1.1 - 1.2 milliard Deutschmark by the 
chemical firm, Friedrich Uhde GmbH, a subsidiary of the Hoechst 
group. The authors quote a list kept by the C .E.D.U.C.E.E. 
which indicates over the 1970-83 period most inter-German 
industrial cooperation occured in the chemical industry (with 
contracts valued at about 2 milliard DM), followed by the 
metallurgical sector (with contracts of 1 milliard DM). Despite 
the importance of electrotechnical and light industry for the 
East German economy, the DIW study estimates that there were only 
contracts worth only 300 million for this sector over the 1970-82 
period. In addition to these large turnkey projects, Tirapolski 
and Globokar suggest there may be other agreements worth 400 
million DM. Although the value of these projects is large, it 
pales in comparison to that of the total economic activity of 
West German firms.
Finally, with regards to the claim that the special German 
provisions place West German businessmen accepting compensation 
payment from East Germany at an advantage, the DIW study argues 
that 80-90% of all contracts between the two Germanies do not 
involve compensation. Against this Tirapolski and Globokar found 
an increased use of compensation payment in inter-German 
cooperation agreements but maintain that in most cases 
compensation does not exceed 60% of the contract. This is still 
a high percentage implying some competitive distortion, but the 
limited diffusion of FRG-GDR interfirm cooperation means that the 





























































































In summary then, the above discussion suggests the following
conclusions for EC policy:
1) that the Community rather than the Member States should be 
responsible for government-level cooperation agreements and 
for the activities of the Joint Commissions set up to 
monitor these agreements.
2) that the EC should subsidize or organise more trade fairs 
exhibitions etc. to promote East-West trade and cooperation.
3) that the EC should encourage and possibly finance common 
efforts to promote East-West industrial cooperation on the 
part of the embassies of the Member States in East European 
countries .
4) that the EC could improve the statistics available on East- 
West cooperation simply by pooling the information already 
held by trade ministries, Chambers of Commerce and other 
organisations in the Member States. This could perhaps lead 
to the publication of Eurostat estimates of East-West 
industrial cooperation.
5) that in the context of export credit subsidies, a European 
body for reinsurance should be created.
6) that continued efforts should be made towards the 
liberalisation and harmonization of the lists of import 
quotas of the Member States.
7) that the EC Member States would stand to benefit from 
increased efforts to work out a common position with regards 
to technology transfer.
8) that the potential offered by tripartite (East-West-South) 
cooperation should be taken more into account in the context 
of Community policy towards the less developed countries.
As the EC Member States are the most frequent Western 
partners in tripartite cooperation, the Community could, for 
instance, sponsor or organise conferences on this form of 
cooperation. These conferences could serve to encourage the 
exchange of information, to help overcome problems and to 
promote the more widespread use of contracts along the lines 
of the model contracts provided by the ECE, Unctad and so 
on.
9) that while the special German provisions do entail a 
competitive advantage for FRG firms engaged in industrial 
cooperation with East German enterprises, it should be borne 
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by substitutes from abroad,thus making domestically produced 
goods available for export."
Nonetheless,the low GDR share in FRG imports suggests 
that even this covert form of distortion is likely to be of 
limited size.
In the case of interfirm cooperation, the danger of "back­
door entry" is minimal since it could only arise where the 
cooperation also involves other East European countries, or 
in the unlikely event that compensation payment is in goods 
from these countries. However, according to the Irmer 
Report, the problem of back-door entry has largely been 
overcome by the FRG tightening its controls.
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List of Long-Term Cooperation Agreements between the EC Member 
States and the Comecon Countries (as at 31.12.79















supplemented by agreement 
of 10.9.1975
19.11.1974














































Nov. 1977 (supplementary agreement) 
23.10.1971
9.11.1974
6.12.1974 (supplementary agreement 10 
years)































































































Hungary 21.3.1972 duration unspecified
Poland 20.3.1973
16.12.1976 for f ive years
Romania 15.6.1972 for f ive years
Czechoslovakia 8.9.1972 for five years
USSR 6.4.1974
ItalY




Poland 17.1.1974 (long-term programme)
28.10.1975 agreement for 1980-84
Romania 22.5.1973
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